A shameful conquest of itself
Feb. 13th, 2021 03:07 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
qatsiBook Review: How Britain Ends - English Nationalism and the Rebirth of Four Nations, by Gavin Esler
By chance I discovered this book in a recent FT review, and decided to obtain a copy as it was released. Esler makes a case for having some knowledge across the United Kingdom, having lived for a time in each of the four capital cities; also by virtue of being born a Scot, with some Ulster ancestry.
One of the main recurring themes in Esler's book is the lack of clear distinction between "British" and "English". It irks me when international politicians frequently use these words as synonyms, yet I can't offer anything other than a strict geographical distinction either. But no-one ever conflates "British" with "Scottish", "Welsh" or (any form of) "Irish". The United Kingdom is politically dominated by England, and this is a problem when the other nations do not align with it. The most obvious current symptom of this is the apparently unstoppable charge for Scottish independence. Northern Ireland Unionism is something of a further oddity, being perhaps the only part of the Union craving a "Britishness" that no-one else thinks exists; Esler finds stirrings towards a referendum on Irish unification outside strongly partisan members of the community. But even the English are divided, into areas predominantly under the capital's influence, and what Esler describes as "England-outside-London". (I am not sure this is an entirely accurate division, but it's a convenient shorthand). And don't forget, the English are immigrants too. Esler quotes John of Gaunt but points out his name means "of Ghent", and recalls an insistent "English" taxi driver with the name of "Fleming".
Esler's diagnosis relies largely on what he describes as "nostalgic pessimism", a sense familiar from Ian Hislop's Olden Days that things were better in the past. It's true that things were different in the past, and some people may not like some of the changes since then, but it's not possible to cherry-pick only the changes you prefer. Unfortunately this is precisely what the populist proponents of "nostalgic optimism" promise, and it has been feeding a growing sector of the electorate in England in particular, with a ready scapegoat in the form of the EU. He co-opts Dean Acheson's quote about Britain having "lost an empire, and failed to find a role" into the specifically English malaise.
Unsurprisingly, for someone who stood for Change UK, Esler attributes a large amount of blame to the democratic deficit of the FPTP voting system, which frequently ensures large majorities for governing parties based on a minority of votes. Each of the national assemblies outside of England has some more proportional form of voting, though they are all different, and only Northern Ireland uses the Single Transferable Vote, which is probably the closest to a "gold standard" (though no voting system can ensure an absence of anomalies). There's also a deficit in our non-governmental institutions: so many are London-centric, there's no consistency on whether they are for "England" or "Britain", and so on. Esler touts a federal system as his preferred option, with a written constitution, a fairly-elected English parliament, abolition or severe reform of the House of Lords, and a UK-wide government only for limited matters that apply across the four nations, observing that in various ways we are not so far from it in any case. But he points out that the constitutional arrangements of the nations across the British Isles have been adjusted approximately every 100 years, in 1603, 1707, 1801 and 1922, and his writing seems to have an air of fatalism that the break-up of the United Kingdom is the more likely outcome.
By chance I discovered this book in a recent FT review, and decided to obtain a copy as it was released. Esler makes a case for having some knowledge across the United Kingdom, having lived for a time in each of the four capital cities; also by virtue of being born a Scot, with some Ulster ancestry.
One of the main recurring themes in Esler's book is the lack of clear distinction between "British" and "English". It irks me when international politicians frequently use these words as synonyms, yet I can't offer anything other than a strict geographical distinction either. But no-one ever conflates "British" with "Scottish", "Welsh" or (any form of) "Irish". The United Kingdom is politically dominated by England, and this is a problem when the other nations do not align with it. The most obvious current symptom of this is the apparently unstoppable charge for Scottish independence. Northern Ireland Unionism is something of a further oddity, being perhaps the only part of the Union craving a "Britishness" that no-one else thinks exists; Esler finds stirrings towards a referendum on Irish unification outside strongly partisan members of the community. But even the English are divided, into areas predominantly under the capital's influence, and what Esler describes as "England-outside-London". (I am not sure this is an entirely accurate division, but it's a convenient shorthand). And don't forget, the English are immigrants too. Esler quotes John of Gaunt but points out his name means "of Ghent", and recalls an insistent "English" taxi driver with the name of "Fleming".
Esler's diagnosis relies largely on what he describes as "nostalgic pessimism", a sense familiar from Ian Hislop's Olden Days that things were better in the past. It's true that things were different in the past, and some people may not like some of the changes since then, but it's not possible to cherry-pick only the changes you prefer. Unfortunately this is precisely what the populist proponents of "nostalgic optimism" promise, and it has been feeding a growing sector of the electorate in England in particular, with a ready scapegoat in the form of the EU. He co-opts Dean Acheson's quote about Britain having "lost an empire, and failed to find a role" into the specifically English malaise.
Unsurprisingly, for someone who stood for Change UK, Esler attributes a large amount of blame to the democratic deficit of the FPTP voting system, which frequently ensures large majorities for governing parties based on a minority of votes. Each of the national assemblies outside of England has some more proportional form of voting, though they are all different, and only Northern Ireland uses the Single Transferable Vote, which is probably the closest to a "gold standard" (though no voting system can ensure an absence of anomalies). There's also a deficit in our non-governmental institutions: so many are London-centric, there's no consistency on whether they are for "England" or "Britain", and so on. Esler touts a federal system as his preferred option, with a written constitution, a fairly-elected English parliament, abolition or severe reform of the House of Lords, and a UK-wide government only for limited matters that apply across the four nations, observing that in various ways we are not so far from it in any case. But he points out that the constitutional arrangements of the nations across the British Isles have been adjusted approximately every 100 years, in 1603, 1707, 1801 and 1922, and his writing seems to have an air of fatalism that the break-up of the United Kingdom is the more likely outcome.