The Fog of War
Jan. 27th, 2026 08:14 pmFirestorm - The Bombing of Dresden, 1945, edited by Paul Addison and Jeremy A Crang
Rather than presenting a singular narrative, this book compiles papers given at a colloquium in 2003. As such, duplications and inconsistencies are to be expected, strengths representing different viewpoints rather than errors. However it does make for a somewhat dry volume that clarifies some areas and equivocates its way through and around others. Several authors make a clear case that there were plenty of reasons to justify the selection of Dresden as a military target - its function in communications and infrastructure, particularly with respect to the advancing Red Army front to the east, as well as the presence of some military industry. The death toll was exaggerated immediately by the Nazis, literally by an order of magnitude (they added a zero on the end of various figures as press reports were handed out); the figure assessed by local authorities, of around 25,000, is considered reasonably accurate. There's some suggestion that the infamy of the raid is down to a careless briefing from an RAF official to an American journalist; it was only one among several raids in the period, some even more destructive (The Americans, then as now, insisted their operations were "precision bombing". Then, as now, the results did not always conform to that position. The RAF position was perhaps best described as one of constructive ambiguity. "Bomber" Harris was all in favour of area bombing to demotivate the enemy; Churchill was also in favour - until he wasn't.). Beyond the question of war criminality (the discussion in that area is worthy but particularly tedious), other chapters consider the reconstruction of historic Dresden both in the DDR period (some buildings were restored provided a good socialist justification could be found; the Frauenkirche ruins were left as a memorial) and after reunification. Perhaps the most engaging chapter is that on Victor Klemperer's Dresden, constructed largely from his diaries.
Rather than presenting a singular narrative, this book compiles papers given at a colloquium in 2003. As such, duplications and inconsistencies are to be expected, strengths representing different viewpoints rather than errors. However it does make for a somewhat dry volume that clarifies some areas and equivocates its way through and around others. Several authors make a clear case that there were plenty of reasons to justify the selection of Dresden as a military target - its function in communications and infrastructure, particularly with respect to the advancing Red Army front to the east, as well as the presence of some military industry. The death toll was exaggerated immediately by the Nazis, literally by an order of magnitude (they added a zero on the end of various figures as press reports were handed out); the figure assessed by local authorities, of around 25,000, is considered reasonably accurate. There's some suggestion that the infamy of the raid is down to a careless briefing from an RAF official to an American journalist; it was only one among several raids in the period, some even more destructive (The Americans, then as now, insisted their operations were "precision bombing". Then, as now, the results did not always conform to that position. The RAF position was perhaps best described as one of constructive ambiguity. "Bomber" Harris was all in favour of area bombing to demotivate the enemy; Churchill was also in favour - until he wasn't.). Beyond the question of war criminality (the discussion in that area is worthy but particularly tedious), other chapters consider the reconstruction of historic Dresden both in the DDR period (some buildings were restored provided a good socialist justification could be found; the Frauenkirche ruins were left as a memorial) and after reunification. Perhaps the most engaging chapter is that on Victor Klemperer's Dresden, constructed largely from his diaries.