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Book Review: Last Hope Island, by Lynne Olson
I picked this up in a work book sale a few years ago. For some time its title has seemed painfully ironic: Britain now rejecting Europe while perennially celebrating the War when "Britain stood alone". As a piece of land, it did stand alone for some time in 1940-1, but even then, many combatants from occupied countries found their way to Britain to continue the struggle.
Olson's history begins with the invasion of Norway, a story familiar to me from the excellent film The King's Choice. Haakon VII was the first of several heads of state who eventually found themselves, and often their governments, in exile in London. (The BBC receptionists at Bush House found it all too much, evidenced by the Ealing Comedy-esque title quote for this post). While Norway, along with other Scandinavian countries, had attempted neutrality, Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands had been in more forthright opposition to Nazi Germany and reluctantly left for London. ("I fear no man but Queen Wilhelmina", Churchill is alleged to have said later in the War). The story of Belgium's King Leopold III is more complicated and Olson's record of it is sympathetic.
Governments and particularly airmen came too from central and eastern Europe. Czechs and Poles were initially shunned by the RAF, in a stereotypical display of British arrogance, but like their latter-day plumbing counterparts, won some respect through their actions in the Battle of Britain. Though the Poles who originally cracked Enigma, who for some time continued their codebreaking within Vichy France, were considered too much of a security risk to serve at Bletchley Park.
Much of the second part of the book is concerned with the Special Operations Executive (SOE). Characteristically, Churchill was attracted to its pugnacious risk-taking, despite ample evidence of its disasters, and its antagonistic relationship with MI6. The catalogue recorded in this book is quite depressing. In particular, operatives parachuted into occupied territory were supposed to include a security tag at the start of radio transmissions, to confirm that they were operating freely. As many of these operatives were captured and forced to transmit fake messages, they omitted the security tag, but on many occasions these were disregarded as lapses rather than signals back in London, which led to many operations and individuals being compromised.
Indigenous resistance groups, whether independent or at least quasi-managed by SOE, could be effective, provided their security was maintained. A combination of unfulfilled expectations and exuberance could prove fatal though, with many groups suffering last-minute vengeance by the occupiers when Allied troops did not arrive on the expected timescale or in sufficient numbers. Indecision and misunderstandings led to the Netherlands being left to fend for itself and starve in the winter of 1944-5. Olson does not focus too much on the revenge sought by liberated peoples on collaborators, real or perceived, though there's no doubt the turmoil provided scope for a lot of unrelated local score-settling too.
For the occupied countries east of Germany, the liberation may have been a relief but was often not such an unalloyed celebration. The USSR suffered greatly from 1941 onwards, but the Red Army was already feared by many in occupied countries, and governments in exile were powerless. Churchill didn't like the situation, but Britain was spent too; Roosevelt was indifferent to the fate of much of Europe and had a cosy relationship with Stalin. Olson covers a lot of material, much of which ought to be better known and taught: they also served.
I picked this up in a work book sale a few years ago. For some time its title has seemed painfully ironic: Britain now rejecting Europe while perennially celebrating the War when "Britain stood alone". As a piece of land, it did stand alone for some time in 1940-1, but even then, many combatants from occupied countries found their way to Britain to continue the struggle.
Olson's history begins with the invasion of Norway, a story familiar to me from the excellent film The King's Choice. Haakon VII was the first of several heads of state who eventually found themselves, and often their governments, in exile in London. (The BBC receptionists at Bush House found it all too much, evidenced by the Ealing Comedy-esque title quote for this post). While Norway, along with other Scandinavian countries, had attempted neutrality, Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands had been in more forthright opposition to Nazi Germany and reluctantly left for London. ("I fear no man but Queen Wilhelmina", Churchill is alleged to have said later in the War). The story of Belgium's King Leopold III is more complicated and Olson's record of it is sympathetic.
Governments and particularly airmen came too from central and eastern Europe. Czechs and Poles were initially shunned by the RAF, in a stereotypical display of British arrogance, but like their latter-day plumbing counterparts, won some respect through their actions in the Battle of Britain. Though the Poles who originally cracked Enigma, who for some time continued their codebreaking within Vichy France, were considered too much of a security risk to serve at Bletchley Park.
Much of the second part of the book is concerned with the Special Operations Executive (SOE). Characteristically, Churchill was attracted to its pugnacious risk-taking, despite ample evidence of its disasters, and its antagonistic relationship with MI6. The catalogue recorded in this book is quite depressing. In particular, operatives parachuted into occupied territory were supposed to include a security tag at the start of radio transmissions, to confirm that they were operating freely. As many of these operatives were captured and forced to transmit fake messages, they omitted the security tag, but on many occasions these were disregarded as lapses rather than signals back in London, which led to many operations and individuals being compromised.
Indigenous resistance groups, whether independent or at least quasi-managed by SOE, could be effective, provided their security was maintained. A combination of unfulfilled expectations and exuberance could prove fatal though, with many groups suffering last-minute vengeance by the occupiers when Allied troops did not arrive on the expected timescale or in sufficient numbers. Indecision and misunderstandings led to the Netherlands being left to fend for itself and starve in the winter of 1944-5. Olson does not focus too much on the revenge sought by liberated peoples on collaborators, real or perceived, though there's no doubt the turmoil provided scope for a lot of unrelated local score-settling too.
For the occupied countries east of Germany, the liberation may have been a relief but was often not such an unalloyed celebration. The USSR suffered greatly from 1941 onwards, but the Red Army was already feared by many in occupied countries, and governments in exile were powerless. Churchill didn't like the situation, but Britain was spent too; Roosevelt was indifferent to the fate of much of Europe and had a cosy relationship with Stalin. Olson covers a lot of material, much of which ought to be better known and taught: they also served.
