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A golden age
Aug. 20th, 2023 11:24 amBook Review: British Rail - A New History, by Christian Wolmar
Wolmar is keen to discredit various myths about the nationalised railway era, but this history is not uncritical. British Railways was formed in 1948, part of the 1945 Labour manifesto, and perhaps for reasons of principle as much as of necessity. The "Big Four" companies had been formed after World War I, but of these only GWR had made a consistent operating profit in the inter-war years; during World War II, as with so much else, the train companies operated under government direction.
There is a catalogue of early missed opportunities. Initial reviews failed to see that the future lay in diesel and electric traction; although the UK had a reliable supply of coal and didn't have the financial power to import diesel in the initial post-war period, there was a lack of foresight in sticking implacably with new steam locomotives. When diesel did come, it was too late: the various improvements in efficiency and experience could have saved some branch lines from closure, but the popular mood had tilted in favour of the motor car, and the government pursued investment in motorways over railways. Managers in the rail industry frequently didn't help themselves; regional structures and identities were retained in the nationalised network, which led to local design and procurement of a panoply of diesel locomotives, many of which didn't survive long in the real world. There was often indifference at best to co-operation between regions.
Wolmar does his best to be fair to Beeching, noting that he introduced a wide range of beneficial changes as well as the notorious report that ensured his reputation. The government, and in particular the Treasury, were reluctant to introduce electrification, but the West Coast Main Line eventually proved a success in the late 1960s. He notes that Barbara Castle, the first woman to hold the Transport ministry, was a "train" person rather than a "car" person, and highlights the establishment of Public Transport Executives in major metropolitan centres as a significant improvement, encouraging integrated thinking across bus and rail services. Rail closures were immediately unpopular, even on services that had been poorly used. He credits Michael Portillo as a junior minister in the 1980s with a part in seeing off the closure of the Settle to Carlisle line, noting with irony that at the time he could not possibly have foreseen his future career as a presenter of popular TV programmes about the railways.
Wolmar sees things as improving during the 1970s and 1980s. In the engineering department, the APT programme wasn't successful; with hindsight Wolmar attributes this to insufficient investment, but finances were tight across the board and the less innovative diesel HST exceeded expectations. In the longer term, the experiences of the APT were exported, and we now have the Italian-made Pendolino tilting trains in their place. If the government had been in it for the long term, that would have been our achievement. (On the downside, Wolmar views perhaps too positively the Pacer trains of the same period, though he does note they were only ever intended as a short-term solution.) In the management of the railways, Wolmar also notes improvements, particularly during and after Sir Peter Parker's tenure. Of course, classic railway advertising had been around for decades, but there was a reawakening of what was needed to compete in the more modern world. Eventual reorganisations led to better co-ordination, and recognition of which services would be genuinely profitable and which would always require subsidy.
The Conservative manifesto of 1992 committed to privatising the railways, without detail, and as a result of the unexpected victory, the process was rushed. This, more or less, is where Wolmar ends his story (a previous work deals with the consequences of privatisation). The agenda in this book is clearly to show that we lost a generally high-performing and cost-effective railway, but I wonder whether there's a sense in which we are always looking back fondly on the past: steam trains offer perennial nostalgia even for those who never experienced them as regular services, but they're dirty, smelly, and prone to all sorts of mishap; diesel and electric locomotives don't seem to have the same romance.
It seems to me that, whilst we can and should have a debate about public versus private ownership, the bigger question is that of the British disease of expecting a Rolls-Royce service for the price of a Mini, in any sphere. Not taking a long-term view has frequently inhibited development of the railways, but that applies both to private shareholders and the Treasury. Until we consider and treat railways, or public transport in general, as a public "good", we won't realise the full benefits of the system.
Wolmar is keen to discredit various myths about the nationalised railway era, but this history is not uncritical. British Railways was formed in 1948, part of the 1945 Labour manifesto, and perhaps for reasons of principle as much as of necessity. The "Big Four" companies had been formed after World War I, but of these only GWR had made a consistent operating profit in the inter-war years; during World War II, as with so much else, the train companies operated under government direction.
There is a catalogue of early missed opportunities. Initial reviews failed to see that the future lay in diesel and electric traction; although the UK had a reliable supply of coal and didn't have the financial power to import diesel in the initial post-war period, there was a lack of foresight in sticking implacably with new steam locomotives. When diesel did come, it was too late: the various improvements in efficiency and experience could have saved some branch lines from closure, but the popular mood had tilted in favour of the motor car, and the government pursued investment in motorways over railways. Managers in the rail industry frequently didn't help themselves; regional structures and identities were retained in the nationalised network, which led to local design and procurement of a panoply of diesel locomotives, many of which didn't survive long in the real world. There was often indifference at best to co-operation between regions.
Wolmar does his best to be fair to Beeching, noting that he introduced a wide range of beneficial changes as well as the notorious report that ensured his reputation. The government, and in particular the Treasury, were reluctant to introduce electrification, but the West Coast Main Line eventually proved a success in the late 1960s. He notes that Barbara Castle, the first woman to hold the Transport ministry, was a "train" person rather than a "car" person, and highlights the establishment of Public Transport Executives in major metropolitan centres as a significant improvement, encouraging integrated thinking across bus and rail services. Rail closures were immediately unpopular, even on services that had been poorly used. He credits Michael Portillo as a junior minister in the 1980s with a part in seeing off the closure of the Settle to Carlisle line, noting with irony that at the time he could not possibly have foreseen his future career as a presenter of popular TV programmes about the railways.
Wolmar sees things as improving during the 1970s and 1980s. In the engineering department, the APT programme wasn't successful; with hindsight Wolmar attributes this to insufficient investment, but finances were tight across the board and the less innovative diesel HST exceeded expectations. In the longer term, the experiences of the APT were exported, and we now have the Italian-made Pendolino tilting trains in their place. If the government had been in it for the long term, that would have been our achievement. (On the downside, Wolmar views perhaps too positively the Pacer trains of the same period, though he does note they were only ever intended as a short-term solution.) In the management of the railways, Wolmar also notes improvements, particularly during and after Sir Peter Parker's tenure. Of course, classic railway advertising had been around for decades, but there was a reawakening of what was needed to compete in the more modern world. Eventual reorganisations led to better co-ordination, and recognition of which services would be genuinely profitable and which would always require subsidy.
The Conservative manifesto of 1992 committed to privatising the railways, without detail, and as a result of the unexpected victory, the process was rushed. This, more or less, is where Wolmar ends his story (a previous work deals with the consequences of privatisation). The agenda in this book is clearly to show that we lost a generally high-performing and cost-effective railway, but I wonder whether there's a sense in which we are always looking back fondly on the past: steam trains offer perennial nostalgia even for those who never experienced them as regular services, but they're dirty, smelly, and prone to all sorts of mishap; diesel and electric locomotives don't seem to have the same romance.
It seems to me that, whilst we can and should have a debate about public versus private ownership, the bigger question is that of the British disease of expecting a Rolls-Royce service for the price of a Mini, in any sphere. Not taking a long-term view has frequently inhibited development of the railways, but that applies both to private shareholders and the Treasury. Until we consider and treat railways, or public transport in general, as a public "good", we won't realise the full benefits of the system.