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Book Review: The Story of Crossrail, by Christian Wolmar
Whereas The Tunnel Through Time focused very much on the psychogeography and history of some inner London districts, Wolmar's book is closer to what I would expect, starting with the origins of the Underground routes across London and observing that North-South routes were established early on, but the city remained ambivalent about East-West routes, making do with the Metropolitan and District lines (elements of which were later united as the Circle line) and the piecemeal construction of the Central line. There's an illuminating discussion on the "objectiveness" of cost-benefit analysis, and the way various lobby groups have operated over the decades, which delayed getting Crossrail off even the vaguest of drawing boards prior to the 1990s. (The DLR and Jubilee line extension were both evaluated less favourably, yet were built earlier, due to influence from the owners of Canary Wharf. And that's before you consider similar projects outside of London.)
The later chapters of the book are more technical (though not specialist), focusing on the tunnelling, trains, stations and signalling - the last of these has been the principal cause of delay, and having read the book, it is easier to understand how this came about. Depending on one's point of view, this can be somewhat ascribed either to a chronic lack of investment in the railways, or EU bureaucracy. On the rolling stock, again, political interference trumps strict commercial considerations, where the bidding would have favoured overseas construction. On the stations, it is interesting to read about the TfL design ethos, somewhat at odds with conventions of the construction industry, but reassuringly in keeping with the iconic designs of the Tube over its history. Overall, we may be exercised by the cost overrun of about 20% (unknown at the time of writing), but Wolmar reasonably makes observations that overruns of 50-100% are not uncommon in projects of such scale (at least partially due to massaging of original estimates to get the project off the ground).
Apparently Lord Adonis wanted to call it the Churchill line but a certain Mayor of London had an infatuation for the monarch even greater than his infatuation for the wartime prime minister. Perhaps we should be grateful that it's opened in the jubilee year, rather than being delayed until yet another round-numbered VE-day anniversary.
This book was published in 2018, so although it has some awareness of the announcement of the delay, it doesn't cover what happened afterwards. One of the interesting aspects of cost-benefit analysis is the sensitivity of the "benefit" side to the state of the economy. Inevitably, a new scheme appears most favourable and is most needed when the economy is doing well; equally inevitably, it seems, by the time it has been constructed, some of the demand will have faded. The financial circumstances in which TfL finds itself in 2022 seem to follow this pattern. Wolmar points out that usage of most new transport schemes eventually exceed their estimates, though we may have to wait some time to find that out. Crossrail 2, if it ever goes ahead, is putatively to be called the Churchill line.
Whereas The Tunnel Through Time focused very much on the psychogeography and history of some inner London districts, Wolmar's book is closer to what I would expect, starting with the origins of the Underground routes across London and observing that North-South routes were established early on, but the city remained ambivalent about East-West routes, making do with the Metropolitan and District lines (elements of which were later united as the Circle line) and the piecemeal construction of the Central line. There's an illuminating discussion on the "objectiveness" of cost-benefit analysis, and the way various lobby groups have operated over the decades, which delayed getting Crossrail off even the vaguest of drawing boards prior to the 1990s. (The DLR and Jubilee line extension were both evaluated less favourably, yet were built earlier, due to influence from the owners of Canary Wharf. And that's before you consider similar projects outside of London.)
The later chapters of the book are more technical (though not specialist), focusing on the tunnelling, trains, stations and signalling - the last of these has been the principal cause of delay, and having read the book, it is easier to understand how this came about. Depending on one's point of view, this can be somewhat ascribed either to a chronic lack of investment in the railways, or EU bureaucracy. On the rolling stock, again, political interference trumps strict commercial considerations, where the bidding would have favoured overseas construction. On the stations, it is interesting to read about the TfL design ethos, somewhat at odds with conventions of the construction industry, but reassuringly in keeping with the iconic designs of the Tube over its history. Overall, we may be exercised by the cost overrun of about 20% (unknown at the time of writing), but Wolmar reasonably makes observations that overruns of 50-100% are not uncommon in projects of such scale (at least partially due to massaging of original estimates to get the project off the ground).
Apparently Lord Adonis wanted to call it the Churchill line but a certain Mayor of London had an infatuation for the monarch even greater than his infatuation for the wartime prime minister. Perhaps we should be grateful that it's opened in the jubilee year, rather than being delayed until yet another round-numbered VE-day anniversary.
This book was published in 2018, so although it has some awareness of the announcement of the delay, it doesn't cover what happened afterwards. One of the interesting aspects of cost-benefit analysis is the sensitivity of the "benefit" side to the state of the economy. Inevitably, a new scheme appears most favourable and is most needed when the economy is doing well; equally inevitably, it seems, by the time it has been constructed, some of the demand will have faded. The financial circumstances in which TfL finds itself in 2022 seem to follow this pattern. Wolmar points out that usage of most new transport schemes eventually exceed their estimates, though we may have to wait some time to find that out. Crossrail 2, if it ever goes ahead, is putatively to be called the Churchill line.