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To the memory of a Great Man
Book Review: Memoirs, by Mikhail Gorbachev
Clearing the backlog of reviews is this weightier tome, a re-read from the 1990s prompted in part by hearing of the death of Gorbachev last year while on holiday. The book is divided into four parts: Upbringing, early career through to the death of Chernenko; becoming General Secretary and changing domestic policy in the Soviet Union; International affairs; and 1991, "the Stormy Year" as he calls it.
In contrast to Gromyko's memoirs, this is a book I chose to keep. While adhering to the ideals of socialism, Gorbachev recognised many dysfunctions in the party and cadre system, and the deepening economic crisis that was brewing. His assessment of Brezhnev is sympathetic to some extent, regarding him to some degree as an initially capable leader who couldn't later retire as the gerontocracy surrounded him. His insights into Andropov - of whom he was perhaps a protege - make for interesting counterfactual speculations on the potential for earlier reforms. Chernenko, on the other hand, was a step backward, to an already elderly and ill leader. There is a sense that Gorbachev emerged because he was the next generation as much as from any enthusiasm in the Politburo.
The sections on government can be quite dry reading; it is the political equivalent of wading through technical debt, reforming a system so broken that it's impossible to make progress at any substantial rate. The reforms of glasnost and perestroika were notionally popular, but resisted by many internally within the party, and like the civil service in Yes Minister many plans and projects were stalled. On international relations, it's clear that Gorbachev felt he could do deals with the west, but was frustrated by the slow movement of the United States, partly by Reagan's "Star Wars" dreams and partly by political resistance, the inability to consider or accept a reforming Soviet Union.
The final section, on the crises of 1991 that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, is the saddest. In part this is because Gorbachev fought to the end to maintain a political union state, even when it was clear the resistance to this had become overwhelming for various economic, political and nationalist motivations. From this reading, Gorbachev accepted the Baltic states would leave the USSR, more or less acknowledging the illegitimacy of their annexation, but he hoped the remaining republics would stay. Ukraine does not get much mention, beyond noting that Gorbachev did not think much of the republic's leadership at the time, and the Crimea as a popular holiday destination. He does note the position of ethnic Russians in many of the other republics, implicitly holding this as one reason to maintain a union. The extracts from Raisa's diary of the days of the coup in August 1991 are particularly moving. Gorbachev found he had unleashed an unpredictable populist by appointing Yeltsin; and although some of the views could be bitterness at events in the early 1990s, he foresaw risks, if the Soviet Union and later Russia was not appropriately supported by the west, of future chaos and an authoritarian regime.
Clearing the backlog of reviews is this weightier tome, a re-read from the 1990s prompted in part by hearing of the death of Gorbachev last year while on holiday. The book is divided into four parts: Upbringing, early career through to the death of Chernenko; becoming General Secretary and changing domestic policy in the Soviet Union; International affairs; and 1991, "the Stormy Year" as he calls it.
In contrast to Gromyko's memoirs, this is a book I chose to keep. While adhering to the ideals of socialism, Gorbachev recognised many dysfunctions in the party and cadre system, and the deepening economic crisis that was brewing. His assessment of Brezhnev is sympathetic to some extent, regarding him to some degree as an initially capable leader who couldn't later retire as the gerontocracy surrounded him. His insights into Andropov - of whom he was perhaps a protege - make for interesting counterfactual speculations on the potential for earlier reforms. Chernenko, on the other hand, was a step backward, to an already elderly and ill leader. There is a sense that Gorbachev emerged because he was the next generation as much as from any enthusiasm in the Politburo.
The sections on government can be quite dry reading; it is the political equivalent of wading through technical debt, reforming a system so broken that it's impossible to make progress at any substantial rate. The reforms of glasnost and perestroika were notionally popular, but resisted by many internally within the party, and like the civil service in Yes Minister many plans and projects were stalled. On international relations, it's clear that Gorbachev felt he could do deals with the west, but was frustrated by the slow movement of the United States, partly by Reagan's "Star Wars" dreams and partly by political resistance, the inability to consider or accept a reforming Soviet Union.
The final section, on the crises of 1991 that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, is the saddest. In part this is because Gorbachev fought to the end to maintain a political union state, even when it was clear the resistance to this had become overwhelming for various economic, political and nationalist motivations. From this reading, Gorbachev accepted the Baltic states would leave the USSR, more or less acknowledging the illegitimacy of their annexation, but he hoped the remaining republics would stay. Ukraine does not get much mention, beyond noting that Gorbachev did not think much of the republic's leadership at the time, and the Crimea as a popular holiday destination. He does note the position of ethnic Russians in many of the other republics, implicitly holding this as one reason to maintain a union. The extracts from Raisa's diary of the days of the coup in August 1991 are particularly moving. Gorbachev found he had unleashed an unpredictable populist by appointing Yeltsin; and although some of the views could be bitterness at events in the early 1990s, he foresaw risks, if the Soviet Union and later Russia was not appropriately supported by the west, of future chaos and an authoritarian regime.